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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

RULES GOVERNING THE ALLOWANCE OF TIlE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
By MAX P.

RAPACZ*

T is stated in a legal encyclopedia 1 in general use that there are

several English authorities which hold that a witness is the
sole judge of whether answering a certain question would tend
to incriminate him and that there are also several American
authorities which lean that way. In an Indiana case, which is
being frequently cited, the court said:
"Some courts hold that the witness is the sole judge as to
whether an answer will criminate him. Others say, without limiting the statement, that it is for the court to say." 2
Although there seems to be a conflict, especially between the carlier
cases and the more recent decisions, it will be pointed out that the
conflict is more apparent than real.
THE ENGLISH AUTHORITIES

In England there clearly was a difference of opinion among
the judges who participated in the earlier decisions, and there was
considerable hesitancy in arriving at any absolute rules. The discussions revolve about the dicta of Maule, J., in Fisher v. Ronalds3 that the judge was bound by the statement of the witness,
made under oath, that the answer would incriminate. However,
the court did not decide whether the statement of the witness is
to be taken as conclusive, although Maule, J., thought so after an
observation that it was not necessary to decide the point. The
privilege was recognized in the case because the danger was apparent.
The English decisions both before 4 and after" the decision in
*Professor of Law, De Paul University College of Law, Chicago, Ill.
128 R. C. L. 428; see also 24 L. R. A. (N.S.) 165 that there are perhaps
a few decisions which hold the witness to be the sole judge.
2The conclusion of Gause, J.,in Overman v. State, (1904) 194 Ind. 483,
491, 143 N. E. 604, 606.
3(1852) 12 C. B. 762, 766, 22 L. J. C. P. 62.
4In Regina v. Garbett, (1847) 2 Car. & Kir. 474, 1 Den. 236, where we
have the first extensive discussion of the question of whether the court or
the witness is the judge, a majority of the judges, after stating that it was
not necessary to decide the point, stated that the privilege should be allowed
when the witness claims it and there appears to be "reasonable ground" to
believe that it would do so. The judges were cautious not to lay down
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Fisher v. Ronalds show that the extreme view of Maule, J., never
received much support and that the courts were veering away
from it and qualifying the right of the witness to decide. Finally,
in Regina v. Boyes" and Ex parte Reynolds' the English courts

settled" it that the witness is not the sole judge and that it is for the
court to determine, under all the circumstances of the case and
the nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give, that
there is "reasonable ground" to apprehend danger. In the latter
of the two cases the court pointed out that there were differences
of opinion on the subject before Regina v. Boyes and that the
cases before it are regarded as dicta, while Regina v. Boyes is an
express decision on the point.'
any absolute rule in the matter. In Mercier v. Short, (1851) Macnag. & G.
205, 217, the court said that it will satisfy the rule if the witness will state
"circumstances consistent on the face of them with the existence of the
peril alleged and which also renders it extremely probable" that incrimination
would result from requiring an answer. The court found that enough had
been disclosed to allow the privilege in the case.
5In Sidebottom v. Adkins, (1857) 29 L. T. (O.S.) 310, 3 Jur. (N.S.)
631 the court refused to follow the extreme view of Maule J., in Fisher v.
Ronalds, (1852) 12 C. B. 762, 22 L. J. C. P. 62. Although admitting that
there may be cases in which the witness ought to be allowed to be the sole
judge, it was of the opinion that the court was the judge upon the circumstances of the case and reversed the lower court which had left the decision
to the witness who had refused to answer. But see Pollock, C. B., in Adams
v. Lloyd, (1858) 3 H. & N. 351, 27 L. J. Ex. 499, where a year later lie said
that he had always been of the opinion that the law on the subject had been
correctly stated in Maule, J., in Fisher v. Ronalds.
6(1861) 1 B. & S. 311, 30 L. J. Q. B. 301.
7(1882) 20 Ch. Div. 294, 51 L. J. Ch. 756.
8
See Youngs v. Youngs, (1882) 5 Redf. (N.Y.) 518 for an excellent
discussion of the English authorities. Also Ex parte Irvine, (C.C. Ohio
1896) 74 Fed. 954, 962 wherein Justice Taft regarded Ex parte Reynolds as
settling the English rule.
9It is very difficult to determine from the language in many of the
cases whether we have a decision or merely dicta. Also, quite frequently,
the courts fail to give any clue as to whether the particular decision was
for the witness on the ground that the judging is to be done by the witness
or because the witness was entitled to the privilege as a matter of right
under the particular circumstances regardless of who is the final judge
of the plea. Even Justice Marshall was puzzled by this problem when
counsel for the witness in United States v. Burr, (C.C. Va. 1807) Fed.
Cas. No. 14,692e, Coombs' Trial of Aaron Burr 67, strongly urged the case
of United States v. Goosely, (C.C. Va. 1807) Fed. Cas. No. 15,230, 1 Burr's
Trial 222, in support of a rule that the witness was the sole judge. After
some consideration Justice Marshall concluded that the general doctrine of
the judge in that case must have referred to the circumstances which showed
that the answer might incriminate.
The same problem appears in the next group of cases about to be discussed, and it is believed that some apparent conflicts are explainable on
the basis of Justice Marshall's view of United States v. Goosely which without the explanation would have to be regarded as a very strong case in favor
of the witness.
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THE STATE OF THE AUTHORITIES IN

THE UNITED STATES

As in the English decisions so in the early American cases
there are statements and opinions to the effect that the witness is
the judge without any apparent limitations other than that the
claim be made under oath.' 0 It was the conclusion of one writer
that in the earlier American cases the witness's oath was generally
conceded to be determinative of the validity of his claim unless
the court could say that by no possibility could an answer to the
challenged question produce the forbidden result." Dean Wigmore also states" that a few of the earlier rulings in the United
States inclined towards the extreme view of Justice Maule in
Fisher v. Ronalds.
Although some of the early cases both in England and America
come very close to supporting a rule that the witness is the sole
judge, later developments have shown that no such absolute rule
in favor of the witness ever existed. The statements in the early
English cases, as was pointed out in the first part of this article,
were mostly dicta. Likewise, it may be said for the early American
cases that they are either dicta or the language of the opinions
was inaptly chosen, thus giving the impression that the decisions
supported a rule making the witness the sole judge. This conclusion
is substantiated by the subsequent history of Warner v. Lucas,"
one of the early American cases frequently cited to the effect that
it is for the witness to determine the question. That case contains some strong statements in favor of the witness, but they are
explained in the recent Ohio case of McGorray v. Sutter'4 in such
a manner as to give a clue to interpreting other cases with similar
statements, and it shows that they are not to be taken at face value.
' 0 In State v. Edwards, (1819) 2 Nott & McC. (S.C.) 13, 10 Am. Dec.
557 it was contended in behalf of the State that the particular question
would not tend to incriminate and that the court should be the judge. Held,
that the witness was the judge, with an observation that the answer might
tend to incriminate. State v. Edwards was followed in Poole v. Perritt,
(1842) 1 Speers (S.C.) 121, the court stating that the witness, with instructions from the court when necessary, must decide whether the answer
will tend to incriminate him. In Ward v. Sykes, (1884) 61 Miss. 649 it
was held on appeal that the trial court was right in allowing the witness
to be the judge. See also Warner v. Lucas, (1840) 10 Ohio 336, 339 where
the court stated that before Burr's Trial (1807) it had been laid down in
general terms that the witness himself is the judge and that "it is difficult
to perceive how the court can be the judge". ...
"Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Incrimination
Clause, (1930) 29 Mich. L. Rev. 191, 192.
124 Wigmore, Evidence, 2nd ed., sec. 2271, p. 892.
13(1840) 10 Ohio 336.
14(1909) 80 Ohio St. 400, 89 N. E. 10.
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In the McGorray Case it was again strongly contended that
the witness was the sole judge. The trial court, having concluded
that the answer would not incriminate, compelled the witness to
answer. On appeal the court held that the witness was not the
final judge and explained the Lucas Case. It was of the opinion
that the Lucas Case only decided that the claim of the witness was
conclusive with respect to the incriminating evidence sought to be
elicited and cannot be said to decide that the claim of the witness
will be conclusive in any case in which it appears to be ill founded,
or made in bad faith for the purposes of defeating the administration of justice in the case in which the witness is called."5 That
explanation of the Lucas Case has generally been accepted, and
it is believed that when the courts seemingly hold that the witness
is the judge, they have reference only to the particular question
under consideration as Chief Justice Marshall pointed out in
explanation of United States v. Goosely,'8 and do not intend to
hold that it would be left for the witness to decide if it were clear
that incrimination would not result.
The unqualified statements that the witness is the judge usually
appear in respect to questions that are of an incriminating nature
where the witness is entitled to the privilege in any event. For
example, in the much discussed case of Fisherv. Ronalds Williams,
J., in approving a statement of Maule, J., that the judge is bound
by the witness's oath also saw that the answer would have a direct
tendency to place the witness in danger of proving a crime. In a
quite recent American case 17 the trial judge left it to the witness
to decide whether an answer to a particular question would tend
to incriminate him. The defendant on trial objected to the ruling,
and the judge used rather decisive language that the witness was
the judge of the matter. On appeal the court held that the ruling
of the trial judge was not erroneous, but again it was quite evident
to the court that the questions were of an incriminating nature.
Since the witness is entitled to the privilege in any event in the
type of case just considered, no one is harmed when the court
15The English Court likewise pointed out, in Ex parte Reynolds, (1882)
20 Ch. Div. 294, 51 L. J. Ch. 756, when it settled the rule for the English
courts, that any rule of allowing the witness to refuse to answer the question merely on his own statement would not be feasible. It would enable a
witness friendly to one of the parties to aid that party by refusing to give
evidence, a serious question of public policy.
16See note 9 supra for Justice Marshall's explanation.
'7Empire Life Ins. Co. v. Einstein, (1912) 12 Ga. App. 380, 77 S. E. 209.
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states that the witness is the sole judge without qualification, but
it does lead to some misunderstanding of the cases and opinions.
It is believed that most of the apparent decisions and other
statements that the witness is the judge can be explained on tile
above reasoning and are not to be taken too literally.18 On tile
other hand, there are occasional opinions and statements to the
effect that the court determines whether the privilege shall be
allowed without any apparent limitation upon the judge."' To
accept such statements literally would be straying just as far
from the true rule as would be the acceptance of the statements
that the witness is the sole judge. The fact is that the witness
and the judge each play a part in making the determination in accordance with certain principles first clearly enunciated by Chief
Justice Marshall in United States v. Burr."
THE MVIANNER OF DETERMINING TIE CLAIM

It was Chief Justice Marshall who gave us the first clear exposition of the manner of determining the claim even long before
there was any lucid understanding of that particular phase of
the subject in the English courts. Although the language of the
courts today may differ somewhat from that used by Chief Justice
Marshall in the Burr Case, the controlling principles pronounced
in that case have been consistently and substantially followed or
approved in a long line of cases practically without dissent."
8

1 See In re Moser, (1904) 138 Mich. 302, 306, 101 N. W. 588 wherein
the position of the witness was that he was the "sole" judge. The court
denied his claim and stated: "The constitution vests in the witness no such
arbitrary power, and we are cited to no decisions which go to that extent."
See also, Ex parte Senior, (1896) 37 Fla. 1, 19, 19 So. 652 wherein the
court declared: "It has never been recognized that he [the witness] alone
has the right in all cases to decide whether his answer will tend to criminate
him. Such a rule would be mischievous and enable unscrupulous witnesses
to defeat the ends of justice." It seems that Adams v. Lloyd, (1858) 3
H. & N. 351, 27 L. J. Ex. 499 and Taylor v. Forbes, (1894) 143 N. Y.
219, 38 N. E. 303 probably extend protection to the witness as far as any
case, and yet they do not leave it entirely to the witness.
19See Lockett v. State, (1920) 145 Ark. 415, 224 S. W. 952 for just a
bare statement that the court is the judge. See also Sterrett, J., in Coinmonwealth v. Bell, (1891) 145 Pa. St. 374, 388, 22 Atd. 641, 642 which
tends to leave an impression that it is a matter entirely for the court to
decide.
20
United States v. Burr, (C.C. Va. 1807) Coombs' Trial of Aaron Burr
67, Fed.
Cas. No. 14,692e.
21
People v. Mather, (1830) 4 Wend. (N.Y.) 229; Ward v. State, (1829)
2 Mo. 120, 22 Am. Dec. 449; Livingston v. Indianapolis Ins. Co., (1842) 6
Blackf. (Ind.) 133; Floyd v. State, (1851) 7 Tex. 215; Printz v. Cheeny
& Street, (1861) 11 Iowa 469; Counselman v. Hitchcock, (1892) 142 U. S.
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Since the case has been followed so universally, it remains only to
ascertain what principles Chief Justice Marshall laid down in that
case, their meaning, and the manner of their application by the
courts.
The facts of the Burr Case were simple. The United States
government was investigating the charge of treason against Mr.
Burr and had preferred an indictment against him. A witness
(Burr's secretary) was asked if he knew what a certain cipher in
a letter, probably written by Mr. Burr, meant. The witness refused to answer on the ground that an answer might tend to criminate him. It was contended in behalf of the witness that he alone
must be the judge of the effect of the answer and that he could
refuse to answer any question if he would but say on his oath that
it would criminate him. Had the court sustained the contention
of the witness, it would have remained for the witness to be the
sole judge of answering or refusing to answer practically any
question. However, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that there
may be questions to which no "direct" answer could in any degree
affect him and that there was no case which went so far as to
say that the witness is not bound to answer such questions. He
was of the opinion that no "direct" answer to the question propounded could criminate the witness and compelled an answer and
in his opinion set out the principles about which the problem is
resolved in the courts today.
The pertinent parts of the opinion in the Burr Case are quoted
below, and the remainder of this thesis will be concerned largely
with the meaning and development, in subsequent decisions, of the
principles set out therein. Chief Justice Marshall said:
"When two principles come in conflict with each other, the
court must give them both a reasonable construction, so as to preserve them both to a reasonable extent. The principle which entitles the United States to the testimony of every citizen, and the
principle by which every witness is privileged not to accuse himself, can neither of them be entirely disregarded.... When a ques547, 12 Sup. Ct 195, 35 L. Ed. 1110; Wilson v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co...
(1904) 164 Ind. 462, 73 N. E. 892; Ex parte Butt, (1906) 78 Ark. 262, 93
S. W. 992; Ex parte Gauss, (1909) 223 Mo. 277, 122 S. W. 741; Commonwealth v. Bolger, (1911) 229 Pa. St. 597, 79 AtI. 113; Anderson v. State,
(1914) 8 Okla. Cr. 90, 126 Pac. 840; In re Naletsky, (D.C. Conn. 1921)
280 Fed. 437; People v. Spain, (1923) 307 Ill.
283, 138 N. E. 614; People
v. Danziger, (1927) 238 Mich. 39, 213 N. W. 448; Ex parte Meyer, (Mo.
App. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d) 560; Ex parte Berman, (1930) 105 Cal. App.
37, 287 Pac. 126; Abrams v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1933) 64 F.

(2d) 22.
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tion is propounded, it belongs to the court to consider and to
decide whether any direct answer to it can implicate the witness.
If this be decided in the negative, then he may answer it without
violating the privilege which is secured to him by law. If a direct
answer to it may criminate himself, then he must be the sole judge
what his answer would be. The court cannot participate with
him in this judgment, because they cannot decide on the effect
of his answer without knowing what it would be; and a disclosure
of that fact to the judges would strip him of the privilege which
the law allows, and which he claims. It follows necessarily then,
from this statement of things, that if the question be of such a
description that an answer to it may or may not criminate the
witness, according to the purport of that answer, it must rest with
himself, who alone can tell what it would be, to answer the question or not. If, in such a case, he say upon his oath that his
answer would criminate himself, the court can demand no other
testimony of fact ...
"The gentlemen of the bar will understand the rule laid down
by the court to be this: It is the province of the court to judge
whether any direct answer to the question which may be proposed
will furnish evidence against the witness. If such answer may disclose a fact which forms a necessary and essential link in the chain
of testimony, which would be sufficient to convict him of any
crime, he is not bound to answer it so as to furnish matter for that
conviction. In such a case the witness must himself judge what
his answer will be; and if he say on oath that he cannot answer
'2 2
without accusing himself, he cannot be compelled to answer.
From the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall the courts have extracted and developed the three following propositions:
1. That it is for the court to decide, "in the first instance,"
when a question is propounded, whether any "direct" answer to
it may incriminate the witness.
2. If the conclusion of the court under proposition number
one be that the answer may incriminate the witness, it is for the
witness to decide what the "effect" of the answer would be and
to answer or refuse to answer accordingly.
3. That if the answer may disclose a fact which forms a necessary "link" in a chain of evidence which would be sufficient to
convict the witness of any crime, the immunity must be allowed.
The net result of propositions number one and two is that
both the court and the witness judge the question, each within
his own province. If the court decides that an answer may incriminate, the witness is still the sole judge of what the answer
22
United States v. Burr, (C.C. Va. 1807) Fed. Cas. No. 14,692e, Coombs'
Trial of Aaron Burr 67.
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would be; but if the court decides that it can have no incriminating
tendency, it will compel an answer. So any statement that one or
the other is the judge must be considered in reference to which of
the two propositions the court had in mind. That distinction,
while not always discernible in some cases, has been clearly pointed
out in others. In Livingston v. Indianapolis Insurance Company,
which purports to follow the Burr Case, the court said:
"It is the province of the court, in the first instance, to judge
whether the answer inay incriminate him; and if it be of that
character, it is the right of the witness, who alone knows what his
answer will be to judge what will be the consequence of answering and if he declare on oath, that the answer will incriminate
him, or have that tendency, he may refuse to testify."23
Since Chief Justice Marshall first announced the principle that
it is the province of the court to consider and decide, "in the first
instance," whether a direct answer to the question may incriminate
the witness, the courts have interpreted and expanded it to mean
that the court shall determine whether there is reasonable ground
to apprehend danger upon all the circumstances of the case including the evidence sought to be adduced in the particular case. 'This rule is now well settled although the courts use different
language in stating it. Some state that there must be a "real
danger." 25 Others add that there must be reasonable ground to
2
apprehend danger "under the ordinary course" of things. Still
others say that there must be a "direct" tendency to incriminate.The constitutional protection is said to be confined to "real
danger" and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the
23(1842) 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 133, 135. Accord: People v. Mather, (1830)
4 Wend. (N.Y.) 229; Richman v. State, (1850) 2 Greene (Iowa) 532; Ex
parte Gauss, (1909) 223 Mo. 277, 122 S. W. 741; Abrams v. United States,
(C.C.A.
24 2nd Cir. 1933) 64 F. (2d) 22; 28 R. C. L. 429.
State v. Thaden, (1890) 43 Minn. 253, 45 N. W. 447; Overund v.
Superior Court of San Francisco, (1920) 131 Cal. 280. 63 Pac. 372; People
283, 138 N. E. 614; United States v. Heike, (C.C.
v. Spain, (1923) 307 Ill.
N.Y. 1910) 175 Fed. 852; Manning v. Merc. Securities Co., (1909) 242 Ill.
584, 90 N. E. 238; Elwell v. United States, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1921) 275
Fed. 775, Wallace v. State, (1899) 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713; Comm. v.
Phoenix Hotel Co., (1914) 157 Ky. 180, 162 S. W. 823; United States v.
Herron, (D.C. Cal. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 122; Stevens v. State, (1893) 50 Kan.
712, 32 Pac. 350; Foot v. Buchanan, (C.C. Miss. 1902) 113 Fed. 156;
People v. Priori, (1900) 164 N. Y. 459, 58 N. E. 668; Taylor, Evidence,
l1th ed., sec. 1457; 24 L. R. A. (N.S.) 165, note.
25Lindquist v. Hayes, (1926) 22 Ohio App. 141, 153 N. E. 297; People
586, 144 N. E. 342.
v. Boyle,
(1924) 312 Ill.
2
6Mason v. United States, (1917) 244 U. S. 362, 37 Sup. Ct. 621, 61
L. Ed. 1198; Regina v. Boyes, (1861) 1 B. & S.311, 30 L J. Q. B. 301.
27Abrams v. United States, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1933) 64 F. (2d) 22.
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ordinary course of law.2 8

So our next problem is: What will

constitute "real danger" or a "reasonable apprehension" of danger?
It must appear to the court from the character of the question and
other facts adduced in the case that there is some "tangible and
substantial" probability that the answer of the witness may help
to convict him of some crime. 29 That may require careful delving into the facts before a court can say that reasonable ground
exists.
This delving into facts has in turn given rise to the question
of how far the witness can be compelled to show or explain how an
answer would incriminate him. Here it is necessary to distinguish
between a showing that the question nmay incriminate and a showing of how it may do so. The court cannot require the witness
to show how an answer might incriminate him, 80 but it may require a showing to its satisfaction that the question, if answered,
may tend to incriminate.2 1 The mere assertion of the witness
that an answer may incriminate will not suffice. 32 A bankrupt
was required to submit, for the inspection of the court, matter
which he refused to file in his schedule on the ground that it might
incriminate him.3 3 An officer of a corporation who was indicted
28 Mason v. United States, (1917) 244 U. S. 362, 37 Sup. Ct. 621, 61
L. Ed. 1198; State v. Wood, (1926) 99 Vt. 490, 134 Atl. 697; Regina v.
Boyes, (1861) 1 B. & S. 311, 30 L. J. Q. B. 301. In Regina v. Boyes the
witness still refused to testify, after being presented with a pardon from the
Crown, on the ground that the pardon would not prevent impeachment by
Parliament. The court held that the trial judge should have compelled an
answer considering the possibility of impeachment too remote though possible. On the point of the danger to be apprehended the court said: "We
are of opinion that the danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary
course of things-not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character,
having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so
improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct.
We think that a merely remote and naked possibility should not be suffered
to obstruct the administration of justice"-(p. 330). American courts
frequently
adopt this phraseology.
29Ex parte Wagner, (C.C. Ohio 1896) 74 Fed. 954.
3°People v. Mather, (1830) 4 Wend. (N.Y.) 229; Wallace v. State,
(1899) 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713; Comm. v. Phoenix Hotel Co., (1914) 157
Ky. 180, 162 S. W. 823.
3"People v. Danziger, (1927) 238 Mich. 39, 213 N. W. 448.
32In Bradley v. Clark, (1901) 133 Cal. 196, 65 Pac. 395 the trial court
sustained the witness on his naked declaration but was reversed on appeal.
Accord: United States 'v. Collins, (D.C. Or. 1906) 145 Fed. 709.
3In re Naletsky, (D.C. Conn. 1921) 280 Fed. 437; In re Hess, (D.C.
Pa. 1904) 134 Fed. 109; see also Brown v. United States, (1927) 276 U. S.
134, 48 Sup. Ct. 288, 72 L. Ed. 500, where an officer of an unincorporated
association, charged with violation of the anti-trust laws, was required to
produce the books in court.
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and who refused to surrender the books of the corporation to a
receiver on the plea that they might incriminate him was required
to place the matter in such shape that the court could intelligently
determine the question from an examination of the averments of
the answer or, if necessary, from an inspection of the books and
documents whether they would have that tendency. 3 '
In most instances the question propounded to a witness will,
upon its face, disclose whether or not it has a tendency to incriminate. But if it does not appear from the question itself, as
when the question seems innocent in form but with a possibility
that it might incriminate, then it is the "duty" of the witness to
make it appear to the court that his answer might at least have
that tendency. 35 And it is not for the witness to surmise that
another question is going to follow which will tend to convict him
38
of a felony, and therefore refuse to answer the first question.
Where the court should stop in its demand for an explanation is
a troublesome question which must be left largely to the sound
discretion of the judge in each particular case. The following
quotation may well serve as a guide for any judge.
"In respect to this claim of privilege there are two extremes,
which ought to be avoided: First, that of requiring from a witness who has honestly claimed the privilege, any explanation whatever of his reason for refusing to answer if the court can see
how such answer may fairly and reasonably tend to incriminate
him: and, second, that of permitting a witness to interpose the
shield of apprehended peril as a protection against every question which he is disinclined to answer, although there be nothing
in the circumstances of the case which in the least suggests the
'
danger."37

It has been suggested that the disclosures might be made without
the hearing of the jury, just as questions involving the admissibility
of evidence are usually presented by counsel, but that none the less
this would amount to compulsion and has never been favored by
the courts.38
34Manning v. Mercantile Securities Co., (1909) 242 IIl. 584, 90 N. E.
238.
35In

re Rogers, (1900)

129 Cal. 468, 62 Pac. 47.

36Overund v. Superior Court of San

Francisco, (1920) 131 Cal. 280, 63

Pac. 372.
37
Justice Martin in Freess v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co., (1893) 67
Hun 205, 213, 22 N. Y. S.104, 109, aff'd 140 N. Y. 639, 35 N. E. 892.
384 Wigmore, Evidence, 2nd ed., sec. 2271.
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THE WITNESS Is THE JUDGE OF THE EFFECT OF THE ANSWER

Although there are many cases repeating the second proposition of the Burr Case that the witness is the judge of the effect of
the answer, only a few of them indicate what is meant by it. When
the counsel in the Burr Case argued that the witness was the sole
judge of the effect of the answer, he had in mind the broad general
proposition that the witness had the right to determine in the first
instance whether the question was incriminating.3 9 As was previously observed, that contention was not sustained, and Chief
Justice Marshall must have intended that the witness shall be the
judge of the effect of the answer only when the question is such
that an answer may incriminate. That is the interpretation generally given to the phrase in subsequent decisions.40 Occasionally,
however, the courts have used the expression in reference to the
right of the court to decide, in the first instance, whether the par4
ticular question is incriminating at all. 1
If the question propounded be such that an answer to it might
incriminate the witness, it is well settled that it must be left to
the witness to decide whether the answer, if given, would incriminate him.42 This is said to be on the ground that the courts
cannot decide upon the effect of the answer without knowing what
it is, and a disclosure of the fact would strip the witness of his
privilege. The courts recognize the impossibility of anticipating
the answer in most cases, 43 and so leave it mainly to the witness,
who understands his peril and the direction in which the questions
and answers may lead, whether it were better not to answer such
44
questions at all.
39
See 2 Elliot, Evidence, (1904) 1008 where the writer apparently uses
the phrase in this more general sense.
0
4 See Overman v. State, (1924) 194 Ind. 483, 143 N. F. 604 where it is
pointed out clearly that the court determines whether an answer might
criminate the witness, but that in its determination it is bound by the statements of the witness as to its "effect" and that if the question be of such a
nature that the answer may or may not incriminate him then the witness's
determination is final. See also Kirschner v. State, (1859) 9 Wis. 133, 136
for a similar interpretation of the phrase.
4'Forbes v. Willard, (1868) 37 How. Prac. (N.Y.) 193, 197.
42People v. Mather, (1830) 4 Wend. (N.Y.) 229 is the leading case on
this point and is frequently cited without any further discussion of the

matter.

43 People ex rel. Taylor v. Forbes, (1894) 143 N. Y. 219, 38 N. E. 303;
Jarvin v. Scammon, (1854) 29 N. H. 280.
44Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. v. Bailey, (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 234
S. W. 412.
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THE WITNESS IS ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGE IF
WOULD FURNISH ONE "LINKc"

IN A CHAIN

OF
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It is this third proposition of the Burr Case which causes the
courts the most trouble. The position of the prosecuting attorney
in the Burr Case was that a witness can never refuse to answer any
question unless that answer, unconnected with other testimony,
would be sufficient to convict him of a crime. Chief Justice
Marshall thought that to be too narrow a view of the privilege
and pointed out that such a rule would practically render the
privilege useless. He stated the rule to be that the witness may
not be compelled to answer, "if such answer may disclose a fact
which forms a necessary and essential link in the chain of testimony, which would be sufficient to convict him of any crime ..
"
The courts are uniformly adhering to this rule laid down by
Chief Justice Marshall, and if an answer may disclose a single
material fact in the "chain" the privilege must be allowed.'
The
difficulty comes in applying the rule and lies chiefly in determining
whether the facts of any particular case bring the party within
the rule. On what facts will constitute a "link" within the mueaning of the rule there is a considerable divergence of views. The
difficulties of the problem and the divergence in views are well
illustrated by a couple of quotations.
In Fisher v. Ronalds, Maule, J., in arguing that it is the witness who is to use his discretion and not the judge, put the problem thus:
"The witness might be asked, Were you in London on such a
day? and, though apparently a very simple question, he might have
good reason to object to answer it, knowing that, if he admitted
that he was in London that day, his admission might complete a
chain of evidence against him which would lead to his conviction."'That represents a liberal view which would permit a witness to
refuse an answer to almost any question which might be asked.
On the other hand, in Ex parte Iraine, Chief Justice Taft said:
"It is impossible to conceive of a question which might not
elicit a fact useful as a link in proving some supposable crime
against a witness. The mere statement of his name or of his place
5
" United States v. Burr, (C.C. Va. 1807) Fed. Cas. No. 14,692e,
Coombs'
Trial of Aaron Burr 67. (Italics are the writer's).
6
" Simmons v. Holster, (1868) 13 Minn. 236; Internal Revenue Agent
v. Sullivan, (D.C. N.Y. 1923) 287 Fed. 138; People v. Zazove, (1924) 311

Ill. 198, 142 N. E. 543; Wharton, Evidence, 3rd ed., sec. 533.
47(1853) 12 C. B. 762, 765, 22 L. J. C. P. 62.
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of residence might identify him as a felon, but it is not enough
that the answer to the question may furnish evidence out of the
witness' mouth of a fact which, upon some imaginary hypothesis,
would be the one link wanting in the chain of proof against him
of a crime. It must appear to the court, from the character of the
question, and the other facts adduced in the case, that there is
the answer of the
some tangible and substantial probability that
4 8
witness may help to convict him of a crime."

This quotation is more representative of the approach to the
problem than the opinion of Maule, J., but the question is not one
susceptible of settlement by any rule of thumb as is well illustrated
by the more recent case of In re Moser,49 where the judges of the
same court disagreed as to whether the witness had brought himself within the privilege on the facts of the particular case.
It is believed that the courts generally have strayed far from
Chief Justice Marshall's view on what facts tend to criminate. In
Counselnan v. Hitchcock5 one of the leading cases on the entire
subject of self-incrimination, it was contended in behalf of the
government that the fact that an answer may uncover clews and
furnish the names of witnesses which may assist the government
to convict the witness does not of itself entitle him to the privilege.
The court did not agree with that view and practically laid down
a rule which classifies as incriminating evidence which is not incriminating in itself but likely to lead to the discovery of such
evidence.51 That would seem to be a considerable departure from
Justice Marshall's view in the Burr Case that the witness is
excused only if a "direct" answer would tend to incriminate. An
answer which would merely lead to further questioning which
might prove incriminating was not regarded by Chief Justice Marshall as sufficient to excuse an answer to the first question not
directly incriminating. According to Chief Justice Marshall the
fact had to be a "necessary and essential" link in a chain of evidence which would convict the witness.
Having departed from Chief Justice Marshall's conservative
view of what facts constitute a forbidden link, the courts nevertheless had to draw the line somewhere, and it is but natural that
48(C.C. S.D. 1896) 74 Fed. 954, 960.
49(1904) 138 Mich. 302, 101 N. W. 588.
:0(1892) 142 U. S. 547, 12 Sup. Ct. 195, 35 L. Ed. 1110.
51
The Supreme Court has been severely criticized for its liberal views
in the Counselman Case. See Corwin, E. S., The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, (1930) 29 Mich. L. Rev. 191, 205; 4
Wigmore, Evidence, 2nd ed., sec. 2261, p. 862.
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opinions should differ as to where that line ought to be drawn. It
has been pointed out that this proposition of not giving any evidence which may form a link cannot be maintained to its full
extent, since there is no answer which a witness could give that
might not become part of a "supposable concatenation of incidents"
from which criminality of some kind may be inferred.1 - The rule
that one link of incriminating evidence excuses the witness must be
regarded as limited by the corollary rule that there must be reasonable ground to apprehend danger.
The question of what constitutes a link arises most frequently
in two types of situations which also serve to illustrate the difficulties involved. The first involves the disclosure of whether the
witness was present at a certain place at a given time; and the
second involves the naming of persons who might disclose other
evidence towards the conviction of the witness. The issue involved
in the first question was raised at an early date in United States v.
Miller.53 The witness was asked by the prosecution if he saw the
defendant, on trial for duelling, shoot at X. It was pointed out,
in behalf of the witness, that in any prosecution of himself in connection with the same offense the government would have to prove
his presence and therefore to require him to admit his presence
tended to incriminate him. The court ruled that he must answer
on the ground that no "direct" answer could furnish evidence
against him. Chief Judge Cranch, however, was of the opinion
that the privilege ought to be allowed, and the courts seem to be
54
following his view of the matter.

As to whether a witness should be required to disclose the
names of persons who might later testify against him, there is
some difference of opinion. The question appears to have been
first raised in the early case of Ward v. State5 where the witness
was asked who, not naming himself, bet at faro. The court ruled
that he must answer, pointing out that the offense was not in being
present but in betting and that the law will not permit a man to
keep offenses and offenders a secret just because the offenders
may in their turn give evidence against him. Again, recently in
52
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 10th ed., sec. 466.
5
3

(C.C. D.C. 1821) 2 Cranch 247, Fed. Cas. No. 772.
Ex parte Hughes, (1909) 57 Tex. Cr. R. 82, 121 S. W. 1118; Ex parte
Werner, (1924) 46 R. I. 1, 124 Ati. 195; Ex parte Crow, (1932) 126 Cal.
App. 617, 14 P. (2d) 918, 920.
55
Ward v. State, (1829) 2 Mo. 120, 22 Am. Dec. 449.
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In re Doyle,"; a federal court held that the disclosure of a list of
names of persons with whom it was alleged the witness had split
fees would not tend to incriminate, the court saying: "The question is, not whether by his answer the prosecutor would perhaps
be able to get leads to other witnesses, but whether an answer to
the particular question would put the witness in danger." Although the two cases perhaps represent the general rule,"7 there
are some authorities which take a more liberal view towards the
withholding of names of persons who might serve to convict the
witness of a crime. They regard it as furnishing a link in a chain
and hold that the witness need not disclose such names.5 8
One other illustration will serve to show the care which must
be used in determining when there is that connection which the
courts call a "link." In Ex parte January5 the witness was asked
if he had purchased any liquor within twelve months, and he
refused to answer on the ground that the answer would tend to
incriminate him. The purchase of liquor was not a crime, and
the trial court committed him for contempt. On appeal the wit-

ness was ordered discharged because possession of liquor was a
crime and if he admitted buying it, he might later be indicted for
possession and thus have furnished a "link" in the chain.
SUMMARY AND

CONCLUSIONS

The matter of determining whether the privilege shall be
allowed in any particular case does not rest entirely with either
the judge or the witness, but both participate in the determination
in accordance with certain established rules.
The rules governing the privilege are now pretty well settled.
Any differences which still exist are in the language in which the
rules are stated, in the manner of applying the rules, and in what
Justice Mitchell of the Minnesota supreme court has called the
"burden of proof." Justice Mitchell, in State v. Thaden,"0 has
given us what is perhaps the best exposition and summary of the
problems involved and the manner of applying existing rules since
56(D.C. N.Y. 1930) 42 F. (2d) 686.
5740 Cyc. 2540.
58 Minters v. People, (1891) 139 Ill. 363, 29 N. E. 45; People v. Zazove.
(1924) 311 Ill. 198, 142 N. E. 543; People v. Newmark, (1924) 312 Ill. 625,
144 N. E. 338; see also Counselman v. Hitchcock, (1892) 142 U. S. 547.
12 Sup. Ct. 195, 35 L. Ed. 1110.
59(1922) 295 Mo. 653, 246 S. W. 241.

80(1890) 43 Minn. 253, 45 N. W. 447.
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Chief Justice Marshall first analyzed the problem so clearly and
reached a solution now universally regarded as correct. In view
of the excellence of Justice Mitchell's opinion and its general approval by courts as a correct statement of the law, it seems appropriate to quote a considerable part thereof in concluding this
article. Justice Mitchell summarized as follows:
"While no principle of the common law is more firmly established than that which affords a witness the privilege of refusing
to answer any question which will criminate himself, yet its
application is attended with practical difficulties. To hold that the
witness himself is the sole and absolute judge whether the answer
will criminate him would be to place it in his power to withhold
evidence whenever he saw fit. Such a rule could not be tolerated
for a moment. On the other hand, to require him to state what
answer he would have to give, or to explain fully how his answer
would tend to criminate, would deprive him of the very protection which the law designs to afford. Moreover, the reason of
the rule forbids that it should be limited to confessions of guilt or
statements which may be proved in subsequent prosecutions as
admissions of facts sought to be established therein; but it should
be extended to the disclosure of any fact which might constitute
an essential link in a chain of evidence by which guilt might be
established, although the fact alone would not indicate any crime.
Hence the problem is how to administer the rule so as to afford
full protection to the witness, and at the same time prevent simulated excuses. All the authorities agree to the general proposition
that the statement of the witness that the answer will tend to
criminate himself is not necessarily conclusive, but that this is a
question which the court will determine from all the circumstances
of the particular case, and the nature of the evidence which the
witness is called upon to give. But the question on which the cases
seem to differ is as to what we may call the burden of proof;
some holding that the statement of the witness must be accepted
as true, unless it affirmatively appears from the circumstances of
the particular case that he is mistaken, or acts in bad faith, while
other cases hold that, to entitle a witness to the privilege of silence,
the court must be able to see, from the circumstances of the case
and the nature of the evidence called for, that there is reasonable
ground to apprehend danger to the witness, if he is compelled to
answer. . . .The difference is theoretical, rather than practical;
for it would be difficult to conceive of an instance where the circumstances of the case, and the nature of the evidence called for,
would be entirely neutral in their probative force upon the question whether or not there was reasonable ground to apprehend that
the answer might tend to criminate the witness. After consideration of the question, and an examination of the authorities, our
conclusion is that the best practical rule is that laid down in some
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of the English cases, and adopted and followed by Chief Justice
Cockburn, in Reg. v. Boyes," . . . 'that, to entitle a party called as

a witness to the privilege of silence, the court must see, from the
circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the
witness is called to give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer.'
To this we would add that, when such reasonable apprehension of
danger appears, then, inasmuch as the witness alone knows the
nature of the answer he would give, he alone must decide whether
it would criminate him. This, we think, is substantially what
Chief Justice
Marshall meant by his statement of the rule in the
62
Burr trial."

Dean Wigmore has said that Justice Mitchell's summing-up
of the rule leaves nothing to be added, and that it ought to remain
the last word in the development of the rule.3 Dean Wigmore's
statement, however, should not be taken to mean that no further
progress is possible. The latest development is a recent tendency
on the part of the courts to exercise more completely the discretion which they possess in applying the rule. Whereas sonic of
the earlier cases readily awarded the privilege, the recent cases,
especially in the federal courts, show a more inquiring attitude oil
the part of the judges for the purpose of keeping the privilege
within bounds. This is particularly true of the income tax cases
where there has been a closer scrutiny of the questions and possible
answers with a view of protecting the public interest."' In a recent
case we find a federal judge saying that the court is not without
a "duty and a power" in respect to the problem because of the
need of protecting society.65
It would seem to be apparent from what Justice Mitchell has
said and from other parts of this article that the correct solution
of any individual case must depend as much upon the proper
exercise of discretion by the presiding judge as upon any established rules. To that end the trial judge is permitted a wide
discretion in deciding whether the privilege should be allowed, and
if he interprets the situation correctly and acts fairly, he will not
be reversed unless there be manifest error."6 On this point the
61(1861) 1 B. & S. 311, 30 L. J. Q. B. 301.
62

State v. Thaden, (1890) 43 Minn. 253, 45 N. W. 447.
Wigmore, Evidence, 2nd ed., sec. 2271, p. 892.
6 See Doyle v. Hofstader, (1931) 257 N. Y. 244, 177 N. E. 489; In re
Doyle, (D.C. N.Y. 1930) 42 F. (2d) 686; O'Donnell v. United States,
(C.C.A.
2nd Cir. 1930) 40 F. (2d) 201.
65
Justice Chase in Abrams v. United States, (C.C.A, 2nd Cir. 1933) 64
F. (2d)
22.
66Russell v. United States, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 683, writ
634
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United States Supreme Court, in affirming an order punishing a
witness for refusing to answer, said:
"The trial judge must determine each claim according to its
own peculiar circumstances .... Ordinarily, he is in a much better
position to appreciate the essential facts than an Appellate Court
... and he must be permitted to exercise some discretion, fructified by common sense, when dealing with this necessarily difficult
subject. Unless there has been a81distinct
denial of a right guar7
anteed, we ought not to interfere.
Trial judges have not always exercised this wide discretion which
they possess in the matter, and it is submitted that all courts
should follow the example recently set by the federal courts in
scrutinizing the questions and possible answers more carefully
with the view of allowing the privilege less readily in the interests
of society. Although the constitutional rights of the witness should
be protected, the constitutional and statutory rights of the other
parties to the suit or under prosecution as well as the right of the
state to testimony should not be overlooked. The problem of
allowing or disallowing the privilege would seem to call for some
balancing of those interests.
of certiorari denied, 273 U. S. 708, 47 Sup. Ct. 100, 71 L. Ed. 851; State
v. Medley,
(1919) 178 N. C. 710, 100 S.E. 591.
87
Mason v. United States, (1917) 244 U. S. 362, 366, 37 Sup. Ct. 621,
61 L Ed. 1198.

